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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—STATE EMPLOYEES HAVE PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
EMPLOYERS UNDER FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT—NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
RESOURCES V. HIBBS, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that non-consenting 
states are not subject to suit in federal court.1  Congress may, however, abrogate the states’ 
sovereign immunity by enacting legislation to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.2  In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,3 the Supreme Court of the 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The plain language of the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against 
a state by citizens of another state.  Id.  However, the Court interprets the Eleventh Amendment 
to forbid suits by citizens against their own states.  See, e.g. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (reasoning Eleventh Amendment's ultimate seeks disallowing 
private citizens from suing non-consenting states); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62, 72-73 (2000) (clarifying need for inference to understand purpose of Eleventh Amendment); 
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board 527 U.S. 666, 
669-70 (1999) (tracing hundred-year history of interpreting Eleventh Amendment to disallow 
suits against non-consenting states).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment enumerates the 
substantive rights of the Fourteenth Amendment, including due process, privileges and 
immunities, and equal protection.  See id.  The authority for Congress to enforce those 
guarantees is in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides Congress the 
"power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" found in Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.  As such, abrogation of a state's 
sovereign immunity can occur when Congress enacts valid legislation pursuant to Section Five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the substantive rights of Section One.  See Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003) (setting forth valid powers 
vested in Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity).  When enacting the FMLA, Congress also 
relied on its commerce power pursuant to Article I of the Constitution to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity.  See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726-727 (2003).  However, the Court has held that Congress’ 
use of commerce power is an invalid exercise of power for abrogation of sovereign immunity.  
1United States considered whether Congress acted within its constitutional authority by 
abrogating sovereign immunity under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which allows 
private causes of action against state employers to enforce the FMLA’s family-leave provision.4
The Court held abrogation was proper under the FMLA and state employees could bring private 
actions against their employers because Congress acted within its constitutional authority when it 
passed the FMLA for the purpose of remedying a history of gender-based discrimination in the 
workplace.5
In April 1997, William Hibbs worked for the Nevada Department of Human Resources 
(Nevada).6  Hibbs’ wife was ailing due to an accident and subsequent surgery and Hibbs sought 
leave from work under the FMLA's family-care provision, which allows employees to take 
See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 60 (1996) (holding Constitution’s 
Interstate Commerce Clause does not grant Congress power to abrogate sovereign immunity).
3 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
4
 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2000) (enacting family-leave provision of FMLA).  The FMLA 
provides eligible employees with up to twelve weeks of leave in a one year period for: the birth 
of a child; to facilitate placement of a son or daughter with the employee for adoption or foster 
care; to allow the employee to care for a spouse or a son or daughter or parent suffering from a 
serious health condition; or to allow the employee to deal with his or her own serious health 
condition if that condition renders the employee unable to perform the functions of his or her 
position.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2000) (listing allowable reasons for employee to take 
family leave).  The FMLA requires employers to maintain coverage for group health benefits and 
also requires employers to reinstate certain eligible employees to an equivalent position on 
conclusion of the leave.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (2000) (providing post-FMLA leave reinstatement 
requirements).  The FMLA empowers aggrieved employees to sue for monetary damages, double 
damages as a liquidated penalty and equitable relief.  29 U.S.C. § 2617 (2000) (setting forth 
damage scheme for aggrieved employees).
5 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 (holding family-leave provision congruent and proportional to 
remedial objective).
6 See id. at 725 (explaining Hibbs' employment status).
2unpaid time to care for family members.7  Nevada granted Hibbs twelve weeks of FMLA leave 
and authorized him to use it as needed between May and December 1997.8  Hibbs used the leave 
intermittently until August 5, 1997, after which time he did not return to work.9  In October 
1997, Nevada informed Hibbs that they would grant no more FMLA leave and ordered him to 
return to work by November 12, 1997.10  Hibbs did not return on the specified date and Nevada 
terminated him.11
Hibbs sued Nevada for violating the FMLA and sought injunctive relief and monetary 
damages.12  Nevada defended the suit by asserting sovereign immunity barred the claim and by 
denying that Nevada violated Hibbs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights.13  The District Court 
awarded Nevada its request for judgment without a trial, deciding the Eleventh Amendment 
immunized state employers from FMLA claims brought by employees.14  Hibbs appealed and the 
Ninth Circuit Court reversed the District Court.15  Nevada appealed the Ninth Circuit's reversal 
and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.16  The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, 
holding states are not immune from FMLA lawsuits and harmed employees may bring suit in 
federal court for a state-employer’s failure to comply with the FMLA’s family-leave provision.17
7 Id. (explaining reasons requiring Hibbs' need for leave from work)
88
 Id.
9 Id.
10
 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14
 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725.
15 Id.  After Hibbs appealed the District Court's decisions, the United States intervened.  Id. 
(describing intervention of U.S. government).  The federal government may intervene in any suit 
where the “the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in 
question.” 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (2003) (listing situations when federal government can intervene).
16
 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725.
17
 See id. 
3Although generally there is no federal jurisdiction over suits against non-consenting 
states, their immunity is not absolute.18  Congress may pass legislation eliminating a state's 
immunity by making its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and 
by acting pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.19  Section Five allows for enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive 
guarantees, including equal protection under the law.20    In the exercise of the Section Five 
power, Congress can enact broad “prophylactic” legislation proscribing facially constitutional 
conduct to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.21  The prophylactic legislation must 
respond to actual, identified constitutional violations by the state and not substitute as an attempt 
to redefine the states' legal obligations.22   Ultimately, it falls to the Supreme Court, not 
Congress, to define the substantive rights enforceable under the Fourteenth Amendment and to 
18 Id. (explaining Congress’ authority to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to Fourteenth 
Amendment authority).
19 See id.; see also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989) (applying “simple but stringent” 
standard required for abrogation language in statute).
20 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726. (discussing necessary preconditions for abrogation of the Eleventh 
Amendment).
21 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (permitting Congress to enact prophylactic 
legislation under Fourteenth Amendment even if it intrudes on states).  Congress may not, 
however, substantively redefine the states’ legal obligations.  See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88 
(disallowing public employee’s private action for age discrimination because statute altered 
states’ legal obligations).  Congress always has authority to enact strictly remedial legislation 
when it narrowly targets clearly unconstitutional state conduct.  See Kazmier v. Widmann 225 
F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging plain language of Section Five authorizes 
Congress to pass remedial legislation).  However, Congress can enact prophylactic legislation  
prohibiting states from engaging in constitutional conduct only when there is congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented and the means adopted to that end.  See
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80 (discussing requirement of pattern of unconstitutional behavior to make 
prophylactic legislation congruent and proportional).
22 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81.
4distinguish those rights from unconstitutional congressional redefinition of the states’ legal 
obligations.23
To be a valid exercise of Congress’ abrogation power, a statute must exhibit congruence 
and proportionality between the injury Congress seeks to prevent or remedy and the means 
Congress adopts to that end.24  When Congress passes legislation related to gender-based 
classifications, the Court subjects the statute to heightened scrutiny.25  Furthermore, the means 
the gender-based statute uses to prevent or remedy the injury must substantially relate to the 
government’s objective.26
23 Id. (defining Court’s role to review validity of legislation).  Although the Supreme Court has 
authority to review whether a right is substantively guaranteed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it is for Congress in the first instance to determine what legislation is needed to 
secure those guarantees.  Id.
24 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737, citing Garrett 531 U.S. at 374. (clarifying preventive rules must 
exhibit congruence between means and ends in light of evil presented).
25 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-199 (1976) (holding statutory classifications 
distinguishing males and females subject to heightened scrutiny).  The Court has considered if 
Congress had authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under their Fourteenth Amendment 
power for age and disability-based discrimination.  See Kimel, 521 U.S. at 536 (reiterating age-
based discrimination requires only rational basis scrutiny to pass muster); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 
363 (affirming disability-based discrimination needs only rational basis scrutiny to be 
constitutional). In both cases, the Court resolved that Congress did not have authority to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity because discrimination based on age and disability require 
only a rational basis to be constitutional.  Id.; see also, Kimel, 521 U.S. at 536.  By contrast, the 
Court approved Congress’ abrogation of state sovereign immunity in the face of racial 
discrimination for voting rights because race-based statutes must pass the highest level of 
scrutiny to be constitutional and are presumptively unconstitutional.  See South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-313 (1966) (finding racially discriminatory laws require highest 
level scrutiny to pass muster).
26 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S 515, 534 (1996) (finding necessity for important 
government interest to uphold gender-based statutes).
5Prior to Hibbs, only one federal appellate case, Kazmier v. Widmann,27 considered 
whether Congress had authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity by enacting the FMLA’s 
family-leave provision.28  In Kazmier, the Fifth Circuit held that Congress overreached by 
enacting the family-leave provision because they lacked evidence of a pattern of widespread 
gender discrimination with respect to granting family care at the time they passed the FMLA.29
The Kazmier court reasoned that for prophylactic legislation to pass muster, it must be congruent 
with, and proportional to, “actual, identified constitutional violations by the states.”30  They held 
that since Congress had no evidence of “actual” or “identified” Constitutional violations, 
Congress overreached their authority and that the family-leave provision of the FMLA did not 
abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity.31
27
 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000).  Notably, the majority in Hibbs does not cite Kazmier, with the 
exception of stating that the two cases caused a circuit split.  See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725-726.
28 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725-726. Several circuits have held against abrogation on other 
provisions of the FMLA.  See, generally Lizzi v. Alexander, 255 F.3d 128 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied 534 U.S. 1081, rehearing denied 535 U.S. 952 (holding FMLA invalid in abrogating 
states' immunity because FMLA remedies disproportionate to supposed injury); Garrett v. 
University of Alabama, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding self-care provision of FMLA 
did not allow for abrogation).
29 See Kazmier, 225 F.3d 519, 526 (5th Cir. 2000) (describing legislative intent of FMLA).
However, the testimony before Congress indicated the effect of the reverse discrimination was to 
push women out of the work force because the discrimination reinforces the stereotype that 
women assume the traditional role of family care-giver.  See Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 526 (quoting 
statement of law professor that employers give family leave only to women).
30 See id. (discussing need for Congress to have evidence of actual injuries before enacting truly 
remedial legislation); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999) (describing need for Congress to identify specific conduct 
transgressing Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel 528 U.S. at 89 (holding abrogation inappropriate 
if Congress never identified pattern of discrimination or unconstitutional discrimination).
31 See Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 524-525 (dismissing Congress’ purported abrogation of FMLA 
because of lack of evidence of actual unconstitutional conduct).
6In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Supreme Court held that the 
FMLA family-leave provision was constitutional and enforceable against states.32  The Court 
reasoned the family-leave provision is constitutional because it is congruent and proportional to 
the violations it remedies.33  The Court found that Congress had enough evidence of extensive 
gender discrimination with respect to granting of leave benefits to justify the enactment of 
prophylactic legislation to deter gender-based discrimination.34  Furthermore, Congress did not 
overstep its authority by passing this legislation because it enacted the FMLA in a manner 
narrow enough to protect employees from discrimination, without overstepping their Fourteenth 
Amendment authority.35  Finally, the Supreme Court held Congress met the clarity requirement 
for abrogation by making clear in the statute’s language that the FMLA abrogated sovereign 
immunity.36
While the family-leave provision of the FMLA might be a socially justified law, based on 
precedent, it is not legally justified.  Hibbs turns on the question of whether Congress had 
evidence of “actual, identified constitutional violations by the States” with respect to gender 
discrimination.37  The dissent properly points out that Congress had no such specific evidence 
32 See infra, notes 33-36 and accompanying text (explaining Court's rationale behind Hibbs 
holding).
33 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 739-740 (holding FMLA congruent and proportional to remedial 
effect).
34 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737-738 (quoting Congress’ determination that gender discrimination 
significantly impacts working women).  Beyond recognizing a history of widespread gender 
discrimination in the workplace, the Court also recounted Congress’ history of unsuccessful 
efforts to stop gender discrimination by enacting other statutes.  See id. at 737 (listing Congress’ 
failed past efforts to stop gender discrimination).
35 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738 (claiming statutory safeguards of FMLA limiting protections to 
segment of population most harmed by gender-based discrimination).
36 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726 (recognizing clarity of Congress' intent).
37 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-373 (holding states engaged in pattern of intentional 
unconstitutional discrimination before abrogation are appropriate targets of legislation).
7when it passed the FMLA.38  The strongest evidence before Congress when considering the 
FMLA was the testimony of two witnesses who testified in generalities about stereotype-based 
beliefs leading to discrimination, but failed to cite any specific instances of discrimination.39
Since Congress must have specific evidence of a widespread gender-based discrimination to 
enact such a law and the record shows no clear evidence, Congress lacked the authority to pass 
this legislation.40  Furthermore, the thin evidence available to Congress chronicled only implied 
discrimination by private entities, while evidence of state-sponsored patterns of discrimination is 
necessary before abrogation is proper.41
Even if there was an identifiable constitutional violation by one of the states in Hibbs, the 
Supreme Court treated the states as one unit, instead of fifty separate entities, creating an 
unconstitutional form of “guilt by association.”42  Rather than permit what the Supreme Court 
termed as an appropriately narrow remedy, Congress could have crafted a narrower, equally 
effective remedy by avoiding the use of the prophylactic legislation altogether and simply 
protecting the leave of employees on the basis of gender.43  A gender-based statute would have 
effectively accomplished the valuable goal of preventing workplace gender discrimination 
38 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 745 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (arguing evidence before court did not 
support claim that states engaged in pattern of discriminatory conduct).
39 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 747-749 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (recounting congressional testimony 
of two witnesses). 
40 See supra, note 30 and accompanying text (discussing requirements for Congress to enact 
prophylactic legislation)
41 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 745-746 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (clarifying requirement that 
Congress’ exercise of Section Five power come in response to state transgressions).
42 See id. at 741-742 (Scalia, J. dissenting)  (arguing extension of prophylaxis beyond known 
violator unconstitutional); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (holding 
provisions of Voting Rights Act restricted to states with demonstrable history of intentional 
racial discrimination). 
43 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: 
Policentric of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L. J. 1943, 2019-2020 (2003) 
(arguing enactment of FMLA was within Congress’ authority, but now drawn narrowly enough).
8without requiring the Court to stretch Congress' Fourteenth Amendment authority to enact 
legislation.44
The Supreme Court has historically crafted legal reasons to support positions they feel 
socially or morally justified.45  The Hibbs case is no exception to that tradition, although there is 
little legal precedent to support the Court’s conclusion.46  While there is social merit in allowing 
state employees unpaid leave to care for ailing family members in the same way the FMLA 
protects privately employed workers, in a legal system based on stare decisis, significant legal 
precedent should outweigh social merit.  Nonetheless, the majority steered this holding to the 
position they felt best for society, and by no mistake, the Supreme Court's imperfectly reasoned 
decision in Hibbs came to a socially just conclusion.
44 See Post & Siegel, supra note 44 at 2020 (claiming Court's social activism helped push them 
towards enforcing FMLA). 
45 See generally Gerard J. Clark, An Introduction to Constitutional Interpretation, 34 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 485 (2001) (examining U.S. Supreme Court’s modes of interpretation).  Among the 
common interpretive schemes used by the U.S. Supreme Court uses is “solicitude for the 
unfortunate.”  Id. at 494-495.  In recent years, the Supreme Court has been particularly 
responsive to remedy harms suffered by groups in society that have historically received unequal 
treatment.  See id. at 495.  In keeping with this interpretive scheme, the Supreme Court, at times, 
ignores stare decisis to craft decisions encouraging equality.  See id.
46
 The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court holdings in Hibbs are, in fact, the first time a federal 
appellate court has held that Congress validly abrogated the FMLA.  See GARY PHELAN & JANET 
BOND ARTHERTON, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE § 16A:02: Family and 
Medical Leave Act (2002) (citing several federal appellate cases, each holding against 
abrogation of FMLA).
